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Income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) between countries can increase welfare. For
countries in a monetary union risk sharing may be particularly important for the functioning of
the union because monetary policy is unable to address \asymmetric" shocks, the case of some
countries experiencing negative shocks while others are booming. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992)
suggest that the risk sharing provided to states by the U.S. federal government may be essential in
making the United States a successful \monetary union."1
Asdrubali, Srensen, and Yosha (1996) derive a simple way of quantifying the relative contribu-
tions of various channels of income and consumption smoothing within a common framework and
nd, for the states in the United States, that market institutions provide signicant risk sharing
through income smoothing. Using this framework Srensen and Yosha (1998) evaluate channels of
risk sharing between countries in the European Union (EU) and in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and nd much lower levels of risk sharing between coun-
tries. They nd that the bulk of consumption risk sharing is provided by pro-cyclical government
saving with some risk sharing provided by corporate saving at shorter horizons.
Another potentially important channel for risk sharing is capital gains and so far this channel
has not been explored much by researchers. It is important to quantify the contribution of capital
gains to risk sharing given the nancial globalization of the last decade. Developed countries
have expanded their gross (and to a smaller extent net) holdings of foreign assets dramatically.
If, say, German investors hold large quantities of dollar denominated foreign assets while foreign
countries hold liabilities of Germany, denominated in Euros, then uctuations in asset prices and/or
uctuations in exchange rates can have very large eects on the net wealth of Germany. Obstfeld
(2004), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), Gourinchas and Rey (2007), and others point out that
such valuation eects can play a signicant role in the process of adjustment to international
imbalances. Devereux and Southerland (2010) show that capital gains typically are large and
unpredictable (\transitory" in time-series jargon) and they develop a simple Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model which incorporates capital gains. In DSGE-type models, the
revaluation of foreign assets will typically be unpredictable (by the logic of the ecient market
hypothesis) and due to real shocks. Bracke and Schmitz (2011) show, in an empirical paper, that
1For early contributions, see von Hagen (1992), Goodhart and Smith (1993), and Bayoumi and Masson (1995).
2countries with more countercyclical capital gains tend to obtain better consumption risk sharing but
they do not directly include capital gains into their risk sharing calculations. We treat capital gains
symmetrically with other sources of risk sharing and while countercyclical capital gains of a given
size surely provide better insurance than procyclical capital gains, our metric is based on whether
capital gains make income including capital gains less correlated with output after controlling for
world output. Our setting takes into account the size of the gains|numerically small capital gains
will not matter much even if they are strongly countercyclical.
Our sample is composed of countries in the OECD with a particular focus on members of the
EU and the European Monetary Union (EMU). Risk sharing may be endogenous to the formation
of a currency union and hence by grouping EU and EMU countries separately we can investigate the
impact of the euro on risk sharing between EU countries.2 A common currency is likely to reduce
the costs of trading or information gathering leading to higher cross-ownership of nancial assets.
The removal of currency risk may further stimulate foreign direct investment and the integration
of banks and bond markets will imply deeper and more liquid markets for borrowing and lending.
For the EMU such patterns are documented by, for example, Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula,
and Pagano (2002), Baele, Ferrando, H ordahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004), and Kalemli-Ozcan et
al. (2010).3
We refer to the situation where consumption grows at identical rates in all countries as full risk
sharing and we label the growth rate of a country-level variable minus its world-wide counterpart the
\idiosyncratic" growth-rate.4 We dene risk sharing to be higher the less idiosyncratic consumption
growth co-varies with idiosyncratic income growth. As argued above, there are dierent ways that
countries can obtain risk sharing which we refer to as channels of risk sharing. The main channels are
cross-ownership of assets that \smooth" income (making income growth in a country less sensitive
2See Frankel and Rose (1998), De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005), and Kalemli-Ozcan, Srensen, and Yosha (2001),
who consider more carefully how the criteria for optimality of currency areas may be endogenous and provide evidence
from the EMU.
3Srensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (forthcoming) show that
larger holdings of foreign assets are associated with more international risk sharing. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and
Srensen (2007) demonstrate that the integration of U.S. banking markets was followed by increased income smooth-
ing.
4Under the assumption that exchange rate shocks reect supply shocks to tradeable and non-tradeable components
are more sophisticated benchmark can be found as shown by Backus and Smith (1993) and Kohlmann (1995). In a
world where exchange rates are bueted by speculative and monetary shocks, models which allow for non-tradeables
do not deliver simple benchmark statistics and we, therefore, prefer to base our discussion an the simplest benchmark;
namely, that of the one-good model.
3to output growth in that country), transfers that smooth disposable income for given income, and
borrowing and lending that smooth consumption for given disposable income.
We nd that smoothing through factor income ows|resulting from international cross-ownership
of assets|after being negligible in the past has increased steeply since 2000, although how much
depends somewhat on the exact sample of countries. Measuring risk sharing from recorded factor
income ows may, however, miss the boat. The large external asset- and debt-positions built up
in recent years open for the possibility that capital gains, which are typically not recorded in the
national accounts, provide the bulk of risk sharing. We nd that income smoothing from capital
gains is more stable (over time and across samples) than income smoothing from factor income
ows and of roughly the same size post-2000 (but clearly larger pre-2000). The most important
source of overall international consumption risk sharing remains saving.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic theory of perfect
risk sharing and our way of measuring the degree of risk sharing from various channels. Sec-
tion 3 discusses our econometric approach while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Risk Sharing: Theory
The basic theory of international risk sharing is well known for endowment economies with one
homogeneous tradable good|see Obstfeld and Rogo (1996). Period t per capita output of country
i is an exogenous random variable with a commonly known probability distribution.5 Consumers
within each country are identical with Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility functions and perfect
Arrow-Debreu markets for contingent claims exist. Optimal consumption then satises the full risk
sharing relation Ci
t = ki C
W
t ; where ki is a country specic constant, Ci
t is country i per capita
consumption, and C
W
t is world per capita consumption in period t. When risk is fully shared
between countries, the consumption of a country co-moves with world consumption but not with
country specic shocks.
5While the one-good model is less well suited for theoretical modeling of foreign assets, alternative models at
present struggles to t the data and we, therefore, prefer a simple benchmark model which relates real shocks to
output to real movements in consumption. For early treatments of more complicated models, see Canova and Ravn
(1996) and Lewis (1996), who focus on international risk sharing, and Devereux and Southerland (2010) and references
there for recent DSGE-modeling of international economies with real exchange rate shocks.
4If the period t utility function of country i is i
t u() where i
t is an idiosyncratic taste shock
(normalized so that i(1=i
t) = 1 in all periods), then consumption, assuming perfect markets for




t ; in any state of nature. Consumption in
country i is no longer a xed fraction of world consumption as consumption is aected by aggregate
shocks and by idiosyncratic taste shocks but not by other idiosyncratic shocks (including income
shocks).
A testable implication is that expected consumption growth rates are identical for all countries;
i.e.,
log Ci
t = c + log C
W
t + it; (1)
where c is a constant and it is an error term|due to either taste shocks or noise. An implication is
that after controlling for aggregate consumption growth, the consumption growth rate of a country
should not be a function of output growth of that country as long as output growth is independent
of consumption taste shocks. Regression based tests for full risk sharing at the country level are
conducted by Obstfeld (1994), Canova and Ravn (1996) and Lewis (1996)|see Lewis (1995) for a
comprehensive survey.6
International models of risk sharing with a role for exchange rates in a rational expectations
setting go back to Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995). In those models, countries
produce specialized goods and the real exchange rate reects the equilibrium price of tradeables|
see, for example, Benigno (2009). Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2010) is a prominent
example of a more recent literature that allows for equilibrium portfolio holdings in models with
terms-of-trade shocks. Models of this type move closer to tting the empirical data although it is
dicult for models of rational consumers to capture the high volatility of international asset prices,
including exchange rates.
In our empirical work, we use the standard one-good model as our benchmark and estimate the
amount of risk shared through dierent channels. We take equation (1) as the point of departure
and quantify the deviation from this benchmark. We specically focus on the risk sharing role of
capital gains in the same framework as the quantication of other channels.
6The rst tests for full risk sharing, using individual-level data were performed by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991)
and Townsend (1994). The International Real Business Cycle literature, most notably Backus, Kehoe, and Kyd-
land (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995), and Stockman and Tesar (1995) examine the prediction that the correlation
of consumption across countries should be equal to unity. The data are, however, far from conrming that prediction.
52.1 Channels of income insurance and consumption smoothing
We consider variation in Gross Domestic Product, GDP, as the basic risk of country that may or may
not be shared with other countries; i.e., we consider GDP as the exogenous endowment of country
i.7 In this article, we consider capital gains which we show in the empirical section below have
very dierent persistence than shocks to GDP. We, therefore, have to consider the present value





t+s and the permanent income stream that can be sustained from this
is rWi. We do not assume that Hall's (1978) Permanent Income Hypothesis holds for consumption
because it is typically found not to hold exactly, see Deaton (1992), but all modern models involve
forward-looking consumers optimizing subject to their intertemporal budget constraint and we
therefore use the tools of permanent income theory to help decide on how to properly discount
capital ows. If GDP follows a random walk (which we show below is a good approximation)





r). The change in GDP can
therefore be considered as the endowment shock, which would be the shock to permanent income if
the country was in autarky where income equals product (we ignore depreciation and investment).
One way of sharing risk internationally is through international income diversication; i.e.,
through cross-border ownership of productive assets. Net income from foreign assets is reected in
the National Accounts data as the dierence between GDP and Gross National Income (GNI). We





The permanent income stream from this present value will be rZi. Because we can approximate
GNI by a random walk, the innovation to this income stream is GNIi by the same calculation we
did for GNI. If risk is fully insured via net foreign factor income (= GNI  GNI), then GNI will satisfy
log GNIi
t = c + log GNI
W
t + it: (2)
However, capital gains are not recorded as part of GNI and the total innovation to intertemporal
wealth is r(Zi+Ai) = GNIi+rAi, where Ai is net foreign assets of country i and Ai is capital
gains (i.e., it is the change in net foreign assets prior to the addition of savings). We show in the
7
GDP is not literally exogenous but allowing for investment and/or labor-leisure choice does not lead to large
deviations from relation (1), see Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992).
8Gross National Income was previously called Gross National Product.
6empirical section that capital gains are transitory and very close to white noise and therefore the
present expected value of capital gains (the shock to the present value of A) is then simply A and
permanent income stream from the shock is rA. We examine if gross national income including
the permanent income derived from capital gains is fully shared internationally. For this exercise
we need to choose a value for the interest rate and we choose r = :05.9 Using the value r = :05 and
using our empirical estimates of capital gains (CAPITALGAINi
t) as the measure of the innovation to
the stock of net foreign assets, we examine if GNICG  GNI + :05  CAPITALGAIN satises a relation
similar to equation (2).
If risk is not fully shared through factor income ows and capital gains, there are further possible
channels for smoothing consumption, such as depreciation and international transfers. Srensen
and Yosha (1998) nd little risk sharing through these channels and we therefore lump them with
the more important channel; namely, smoothing through pro-cyclical saving. Individuals save and
dis-save in order to smooth consumption intertemporally.10
We perform panel data regressions which measure deviations from perfect risk sharing. As-
drubali, Srensen, and Yosha (1996) show that the specication we use can be motivated from a
variance decomposition which measures the fraction of shocks to GDP that are smoothed through
international factor income ows, through capital gains, through saving, and the fraction of shocks
that are not smoothed, namely, the residual deviation of the international consumption allocation
from equation (1), the full risk sharing benchmark. For brevity, we do not give the detail here.11
Srensen and Yosha (1998) discuss a specication similar to ours (but not including capital gains)
in detail and further decompose the contribution from personal, corporate, and government saving
which we for brevity leave out here.
9Alternatively, the scaling by 5 percent could be obtained with a real interest rate of 3 percent and allowing for
slight persistence in the capital gains consistent with the point estimates we nd in the empirical section. As long as
this persistence is near zero, the 5 percent approximation is reasonable and we prefer this value to explicit estimates
of persistence country-by-country because such estimates will be quite noisy for our short sample.
10Baxter and Crucini's (1995) show that even if only a riskless asset can be traded, equation (1) will approximately
hold if shocks to GDP are transitory. That is, when shocks to GDP are transitory, borrowing and lending in the credit
market is a close substitute for income insurance. In contrast, if shocks to GDP are highly persistent, consumption
smoothing through trade in a riskless bond will not approximate the allocation in equation (1); namely, the credit
market will not closely mimic the role of capital markets|shocks that were not insured ex-ante on capital markets
will not be smoothed ex-post on credit markets.
11A working paper version of this article, which gives the details, is available from the authors on request.
73 Estimation
3.1 Estimating Determinants of Net Capital Gains
In order to help interpret the results involving capital gains, we conduct a minor study of deter-
minants of capital gains in a descriptive (non-causal) sense. Changes in exchange rates are likely
to result in capital gains for countries with large holdings of assets and liabilities because assets
and liabilities often are denominated in dierent currencies. For example, many countries hold
foreign currency reserves in U.S. dollars and those reserves will increase in value if the dollar does.
Similarly, swings in stock market valuations are likely to result in capital gains and losses. We
regress country-level capital gains normalized by GDP on the value of external equity assets and
liabilities, on external debt assets and liabilities, on the change in the exchange rate (the amount
of appreciation), on interest rates, on the interaction of external debt assets and liabilities with
changes in the exchange rate, on the interaction of debt assets with the change in the U.S. interest
rate (10-year bond yield), on the interaction of debt liabilities with the change in domestic inter-
est rate, on the interaction of equity assets and liabilities with currency appreciation, and on the
interaction of equity assets and liabilities with the value of the U.S. stock index and the national
stock index, respectively. A depreciation will lead to domestic liabilities losing value in dollar terms
if they are denominated in domestic currency and we expect to nd increasing U.S. interest rates
associated with a depreciation of the value of foreign bonds.
We estimate the following panel regression:
CAPITALGAINi
t = 0 + 1 ASSETi
t + 2 LIABILITYi
t + 3 INDEXi
t
+ 4 INDEXUS
t + 5 EXCHi
t + 5 Xi
t; (3)
where ASSET is (the vector of) equity and debt assets, LIABILITY is debt and equity liabilities,
INDEXi is the value of the stock index of country i or the interest rate of country i, INDEXUS is
the corresponding U.S. index (approximating world stock prices/interest rates), EXCH is the dollar
exchange rate, while the X terms refer to interaction variables. The interaction variables enter in









: for any variable X is the average over time for country i.
83.2 Estimating channels of risk sharing
The following panel regressions are estimated:
log GDPi
t   log GNIi




t   log GNICGi




t   log Ci




t = u;t + u log GDPi
t + i
u;t ;
where ;t are time xed eects. The time xed eects capture year-specic impacts on growth rates,
most notably the impact of growth in aggregate output. Furthermore, with time xed eects the -
coecients are weighted averages of year-by-year cross-sectional regressions. To take into account
autocorrelation in the residuals, we assume that the error terms in each equation and in each
country follow an AR(1) process. Since the samples are short, we assume that the autocorrelation
parameters are identical across countries.
We further allow for state-specic variances of the error terms. In practice, we estimate the
system in (4) by a two step Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure. Data are dierenced at
the yearly frequency. Because our method is based on panel estimations with time xed eects, it
yields fully consistent estimates even if there are worldwide taste shocks.
4 Results
4.1 Data
The National Accounts variables, GDP, GNI, consumption, savings, population, exchange rates, and
consumer price indices (CPI), are obtained from the OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates
(Volume I) and Detailed Tables (Volume II), 1990-2007. The GDP series is transformed into real
per capita terms by dividing by population and deating by CPI.
The OECD countries in our sample consist of all members except Luxembourg (very small and
atypical), Iceland (incomplete data), and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia,
and Turkey (less developed countries). We use subsets of OECD members in various regressions:
9EMU countries with the exception of Luxembourg,12 and EU-countries, which denotes all the 2003
member countries, excluding Luxembourg.13 We do not have the data needed to construct capital
gains for Belgium, Japan, Greece, Norway, and Portugal before 2000 so results before then are
shown without those countries, while results after 2000 are shown for both the samples without
those countries and for the full EMU, EU, and OECD samples.
4.2 Calculation of Capital Gains from External Assets
Net capital gains from external assets are not directly available. Therefore, we employ the method
of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) who provide a detailed accounting framework which separates
the basic factors|trade imbalances, investment income ows, and capital gains. Net capital gains
from foreign assets are derived as
CAPITALGAINt = NFAt   CAt   ERRt; (5)
where CAPITALGAINt is the capital gains on foreign assets, NFAt is the net foreign asset position of
the domestic country i at time t while the current account, CAt is the balance on goods, services,
and current transfers while the error term ERRt includes factors such as capital account transfers
and errors and omissions that lead to discrepancies between a country's current account and net
inows of capital.14 Curcuru, Dvorak, Warnock (2008) point out that assigning the error term to
capital gains leads to very large estimated rates-of-return (when capital gains are included) on U.S.
foreign asset holdings|returns which they convincingly argue are inconsistent with other sources
of information. We, therefore, alternatively set the error term to zero in equation (5) (implicitly
assigning the errors to the current account data). While this results in signicant changes in the
levels of the calculated capital gains, the results that we present are robust to this change and we
therefore only present results using the convention of equation (5).
We calculate the net foreign asset position using the IMF's balance of payment components.
The net foreign asset position, NFAt, is roughly dened as the sum of the net debt, net equity,
12Our EMU sample consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain.
13The EU sample consists of the EMU sample plus Denmark, Sweden, and the UK.
14Detailed codes and descriptions of each variable extracted from the International Financial Statistics Database
(IFS) are listed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
10net foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and foreign exchange reserves. We use the following
identity to calculate the foreign asset position of country i at time t:
NFAt = DEBT(A)t + EQUITY(A)t + FDI(A)t + FXt   DEBT(L)t   EQUITY(L)t   FDI(L)t ; (6)
where DEBT(A), EQUITY(A) and FDI(A) are the stocks of debt, equity, and FDI assets. Similarly
DEBT(L), EQUITY(L) and FDI(L) are the stocks of debt, equity and FDI liabilities respectively, and FX
refers to the foreign exchange reserves of the country. All variables used in creating the net foreign
asset position are extracted from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS).
To estimate the panel data regression for determinants of capital gains, we utilize annual returns
on equity and debt for OECD members. The data for standard national stock indices are taken from
Morgan Stanley Capital International Database (MSCI) for 1992 through 2007. MSCI provides the
national stock indices that have become the most widely used international equity benchmarks by
institutional investors. For debt returns, for the same sample, we use the 10-year risk-free bond
returns extracted from the IFS.
4.3 Figures
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 displays the average, maximum, and minimum capital gains by country. Most coun-
tries have average capital gains near 0 but annual capital gains can be as high as +50 percent or
{70 percent of GDP, as seen for Finland.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 displays the average absolute value of capital gains as percent of GDP for the average of
EU and OECD countries, respectively.15 It is apparent that capital gains have become signicantly
15The values of capital gains to GDP ratios are averaged cross-sectionally to obtain the OECD and EU values.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK. OECD: EU plus Australia, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and the United States.
11larger (relative to GDP) since the mid-1990s. In most years, capital gains are numerically larger for
the OECD countries, although the dierence is typically minor.
Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 displays the ratio of capital gains to GDP and GDP-growth year-by-year for the United
States. In the theoretical literature, it is often pointed out that terms-of-trade may provide \au-
tomatic risk sharing" in the sense that productivity shocks cause output growth which, if country
output is specialized, will cause real exchange rate depreciation (larger supply of a country-specic
good depresses its price), thereby providing a resource transfer from high growth to low growth
countries. While such mechanisms may be at play for some countries they do not seem important
for the United States or the other countries in our sample (not shown for space considerations),
where no systematic relation between growth and capital gains is apparent. One can also tell
from the Figure that capital gains typically are not persistent, even if the United States enjoyed a
sequence of positive capital gains from 2002 to 2007.
If the equity issued by a country's rms is mainly held abroad and this equity appreciates, the
country suers adverse capital gains. We illustrate this mechanism for the case of Finland where
Nokia dominated the capitalization of Finish stocks from the late 1990s.
Figure 4 about here
Indeed, Figure 4 clearly reveals how huge run-ups in the value of Nokia in 1999 and 2000 let
to negative capital gains for Finland (the large percentage value increase seen for Nokia in early
1990s had no such eect since Nokia was not as large then).16 One can also discern a tendency for
positive capital gains to be associated with periods of depreciation of the Finish currency.
16Exchange rate is Finnish markka (later Euro) per USD. Positive (negative) changes indicate depreciation (ap-
preciation) of the national currency.
124.4 Income insurance and consumption smoothing between EMU and OECD countries
Table 1 about here
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for most variables used. Consumption, GDP, and GNI growth
is between 1.7 and 1.9 percent on average with the standard deviation of consumption growth be-
ing the lowest consistent with risk sharing. Equity and debt assets and liabilities are about 13-16
percent of GDP on average and debt liabilities constitute 23 percent. The average exchange rate
depreciation vis-a-vis the United States is close to 0 but the standard deviations are very large.
Average stock market appreciation has been very high during our sample period. The interaction
terms all display high variance and one can observe that non-U.S. interest rates have dropped faster
than U.S. ones on average, while non-U.S. stock markets have appreciated faster.
Table 2 about here
Correlations between regressors are shown in Table 2. In general, most correlations are fairly
low, although the levels of assets and liabilities tend to be highly correlated because some countries
are nancially open and have large gross positions while other countries tend to be more closed
and hold small gross positions.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 provides information on determinants of capital gains in a descriptive sense. A rst look
at the coecients and partial R-squares reveals that large capital gains tend to be associated with
large holdings of foreign debt and equity in periods where the domestic currency depreciates. In
the early sample, countries obtain capital gains on foreign debt assets when the foreign interest
rate (approximated by the U.S. rate) falls (as expected) but this eect is not very signicant and
not important as measured by the partial R-squares|this is probably because interest rate changes
are muted compared to the variation in exchange rates and stock indices. Capital gains on equity,
13when the U.S. market appreciates, are marginally signicant but negative capital gains are found
in countries with large equity liabilities when the domestic market value increases|as expected.
Table 4 about here
Table 4 estimates a panel autoregressive model (with country-specic intercepts) of order one
of the form Xit = i + Xit 1 + eit where X is log(GDP), the ratio of CAPITALGAINt to GDP, or the
ratio of foreign net factor income to GDP. A coecient  of unity implies that X is a random walk
while a value of 0 implies that X is white noise. The top panel shows that capital gains are close to
white noise with a signicant positive coecient to the lag but the point estimate of 0.16 implies
that the process is much closer a white noise process than to a random walk which corresponds
well with the country-by-country estimates of persistence of valuation gains presented in Devereux
and Southerland (2010). GDP has a point estimate for the lag of 0.99 for which implies that GDP
almost exactly behaves like a random walk consistent with a large literature that nd persistent
shock to output. Factor income is also persistent and close to a random walk. The bottom panel
displays the statistics and P-values for Im-Pesaran-Smith unit root tests and there is very strong
evidence that capital gains are not persistent while there is no evidence against GDP or net factor
income having unit roots.
Table 5 about here
Our main ndings are in Table 5. Risk sharing from (net foreign) factor income ows is high-
est in the EMU since year 2000 where the signicant coecient of 14 percent for the full EMU
sample indicates substantial risk sharing. This result is consistent with increased foreign asset
holdings facilitated by the common currency. This channel is not signicant for the full EU sample
which technically is likely to be caused by procyclical factor income in Denmark, Sweden, and the
UK during this sample period. We also do not nd signicant risk sharing from factor income
ows in the broader OECD sample. Capital gains robustly (and signicantly for the larger EU and
OECD samples) are associated with about 6 percent risk sharing. Overall, the amount of (cum
14capital gains) income smoothing is twice as large as one would estimate using only factor income
ows recorded in the national accounts and smoothing from capital gains is a steady source of risk
sharing. Pre-2000, the income smoothing estimated from factor income ows is a puzzling negative
number for all three country groups but adding smoothing from capital gains results in a more
reasonable coecient of about 0. One might have expected higher risk sharing from capital gains
for the EMU countries, which are likely to hold larger stocks of international assets, but Table 3
revealed that capital gains to a large extent are caused by exchange rate movements and this source
of variation is not present for intra-EMU holdings.
In general, the measurement and timing of factor income ows is not well understood and it
is possible that a more correct picture of risk sharing from cross-ownership of assets is obtained
by adding the estimated risk sharing from capital gains to measured risk sharing from factor
income. If we add the rst two rows of Table 5, the picture is one of zero risk sharing from
cross-ownership before 2000|likely because the gross holdings were small relative to GDP|with
signicant risk sharing from this channels since 2000. The risk sharing obtained through capital
gains are consistent with some risk sharing from endogenous prices but we stop well short of doing
any analysis of causality.
The bulk of risk sharing is provided by (private and government) saving but the picture is still
very dierent from the picture of Srensen and Yosha who nd that pre-1990. saving was the only
signicant source of risk sharing. Risk sharing between countries, and especially between EMU
countries, is slowly becoming closer to that of the United States where Asdrubali, Srensen, and
Yosha (1996) nd that the bulk of risk sharing is provided by private capital markets. Private mar-
kets have the potential to perform risk sharing more eciently, for example, by better monitoring of
recipients of capital ows, and it is important to follow this development carefully and ignoring the
impact of capital gains will lead to a potentially serious underestimate of the risk sharing arising
from foreign capital holdings.
5 Concluding Remarks
We estimate the amount of risk sharing between EMU, EU, and other OECD countries during the
period 1992{2007, focusing on the role of capital gains. This unexplored channel of risk sharing
15is potentially important given the quadrupling of foreign assets and liabilities during the period of
nancial globalization. We nd that risk sharing through factor income ows and capital gains was
close to zero before 1999 but has increased since then. Risk sharing from capital gains is 6 percent
for all three groups of countries, an amount that is as big as risk sharing from factor income ows
for the European Union countries and twice as big as risk sharing from factor income ows for
the OECD countries. For the EMU countries risk sharing from factor income ows dominates risk
sharing from measured factor income ows.
The amount of risk sharing through measured factor income ows is quite volatile while the
amount of risk sharing provided by capital gains is stable across country samples and time periods.
Possibly, this is due to capital gains responding systematically (with opposite sign) to growth with
domestic assets increasing in price in good times as we illustrated with Nokia's stock price in the
case of Finland.
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20Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Stdev1 Stdev2
C 1.67 1.15 1.25
GDP 1.83 1.29 1.49
GNI 1.85 1.47 1.64
CAPITALGAIN 0.12 9.35 8:30
CAPITALGAIN(2) -0.22 9.30 8:21
EQUITY(A) 13.66 13.91 8.33
DEBT(A) 15.31 16.81 10.19
EQUITY(L) 16.49 21.36 9.49
DEBT(L) 23.49 25.47 12.61
EXCH 0:04 4.57 8.46
EQUITYINDEXi 19.68 35.06 34.63
EQUITYINDEXus 9.97 0.00 19.95
INT:RATEi  3:81 3.65 7.49
INT:RATEus  2:67 0.00 10.73
DEBT(A)*INT:RATEus  25:38 140.00 167.94
DEBT(L)*INT:RATEi  95:73 342.56 440:62
EQUITY(A)*EQUITYINDEXus 218.36 278.73 397.35
EQUITY(L)*EQUITYINDEXi 545.21 1468.48 1173.67
DEBT(A)*EXCH  34:84 120.86 154.60
DEBT(L)*EXCH  37:67 240.69 321.48
EQUITY(A)*EXCH  17:48 113.58 138.89
EQUITY(L)*EXCH 1.90 167.32 171.45
Sample: 1992-2007. Countries included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States.
Stdev1 (cross section) is the time average of [(1=n)
P
i(Xit    Xt)
2]
1=2 where  Xt is the period t average of Xit across





where  Xi is the time average of Xit for country i and T is number of the years in the sample. All coecients are
multiplied by 100. CAPITALGAIN in this table is the ratio of net capital gains to GDP for each country. CAPITALGAIN(2)
is an alternative measurement of capital gains where errors and omissions are omitted in the capital gains calculation.
EQUITY(A) is the ratio of foreign equity assets to GDP and DEBT(A) is the ratio of foreign debt assets to GDP. EQUITY(L)
and and DEBT(L) are the ratios of foreign equity and debt liabilities to GDP. CAPITALGAIN, EQUITY(A), DEBT(A),
EQUITY(L), and DEBT(L) variables are all in percentages. GDP and GNI are changes in the logarithm of real GDP and
GNI per capita. C is the change in the logarithm of total consumption per capita. EXCH is the annual percentage
change in the value of the country i's currency per U.S. dollar. INT:RATE
i is the annual percentage change in
10-year government bond yields for the countries in the sample. INT:RATE
us is the annual percentage change in
the 10-year U.S. government bond yield. EQUITYINDEX
i is the annual percentage changes in the Morgan Stanley
Capital International equity index for the countries in the sample. EQUITYINDEX
us is the annual percentage change























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































us  1:61 0:23 0.04
(1.13,0.01) (0.85,0.02) (0.82,0.01)
DEBT(L)t 1*INT:RATE










































us 0:01 0:07 0:04
(0.05,0.00) (0.06,0.00) (0.06,0.03)
INT:RATE
us 0:13  0:09  0:04
(0.09,0.00) (0.15,0.00) (0.13,0.01)
R2 0:81 0:62 0.48
OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the United States. OECD does not include Belgium, Greece, Japan, Norway, and
Portugal. Each column shows GLS estimates from a regression of net annual capital gains on various explanatory factors.
Standard errors are on the left and partial R2's are on the right in parentheses. The dependent variable is the ratio of the net
annual capital gains of country i to GDP. See Table 1 for details.
23Table 4: Capital Gain, Net Factor Income and GDP: Persistence
AR(1) regressions
CAPITALGAIN GDP NFI
CONSTANT  3.77 22.92  0:02
(3.20) (1.00) (0.04)
Coef. to lag 0.16 0.99 0.97
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Panel Unit Root Tests
CAPITALGAIN GDP NFI
Test Statistics  6:62 47.21 0.57
P-values 0.00 1.00 0.71
In the upper panel, we present the estimated parameters of the following equations: CAPITALGAINt=c
+cCAPITALGAINt 1 + ut, GDPt=g +gGDPt 1 + ut and NFIt=n +nNFIt 1 + ut. Standard errors in parenthe-
sis. CAPITALGAINt is capital gains which in the regressions reported in this table are normalized by GDP. In the
second equation, GDPt is measured in natural logarithms. NFIt is the ratio of net international factor income (GDP-
GNI) to GDP. The sample consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the United States. Time period 1992{
2007. In the lower panel (testing for panel unit roots), we employ the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) panel unit root
test with the null hypothesis of variables having a unit root.
24Table 5: Smoothing via Factor Income, Savings, and Net Capital Gain
EMU EMU EMU EU EU EU OECD OECD OECD
92{00 00{07 00-07 92{00 00{07 00{07 92{00 00{07 00{07
f  2 6 14  5 1 5  3  4 4
(7) (4) (5) (5) (3) (5) (3) (4) (4)
k 3 6 6 4 4 6 5 7 7
(1) (4) (4) (2) (7) (3) (1) (3) (3)
s 30 38 24 28 45 33 51 53 44
(12) (11) (11) (12) (13) (10) (7) (10) (7)
u 71 46 56 63 49 55 46 43 45
(8) (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) (6) (6) (7)
EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. EU: EMU plus




 are without Belgium, Greece, Japan, Norway, and Portugal for which capital
gains are not available before 2000. The interpretation of the numbers is the percentages of GDP-shocks absorbed
via the channels international net factor income ows (f), international capital gains (k), and saving (s). u is
the fraction unsmoothed. Standard errors in parentheses. Feasible GLS, estimating country weights and correction
for autocorrelation using the Prais-Winsten adjustment. f is the slope in the regression of log GDP
i   log GNI
i
on log GDP
i, k is the slope in the regression of log GNI
i   log(GNI + 0:05

CAPITALGAIN)
i on log GDP
i, s is




i on log GDP
i, and u is the slope in the
regression of log C



































































































































1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Finland Capital Gain to 
GDP Ratio
Annual  Change in Nokia
Stock Price 
Annual Change in
Exchange rate
Exchange rate is the  finnish markka (later Euro) per USD.   Positive (negative)  changes means the 
depreciation (appreciation) of national currency.